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ANEW conception that is thorough-going always simplifies. In fact it usually originates when a prevailing point of view has 
got overloaded, cumbrous and involved. The notion of behavior is 
already having a simplifying and reducing effect upon epistemology 
and in my opinion is only beginning its career. But a new point of 
view also tends to oversimplify, to neglect, ignore and thereby in 
effect to deny. It is one thing, for example, to deny qualities, mean-
ings, feelings, consciousness, etc., as they have been defined by prior 
theories, especially by modern psychology with its helplessly subjec-
tive and private metaphysics. It is another thing to deny the facts 
which common sense and common speech independently of any 
theory call by these names. Personally, I believe that the identifi-
cation of knowing and thinking with speech is wholly in the right 
direction. But, with one marked exception, I have not seen any 
analysis of speech which appears adequate or which does not lay-
itself open to the charge of omitting and virtually denying obvious 
facts.1 
1. When it is asserted that speech as thought is a reaction, the 
question at once arises: What is its stimulus ? The easy and simple 
reply is wrong. We are likely to say that speech is a reaction to a 
thing sensibly present, that, for example, I say "this is a knife" be-
cause a knife is sensibly present as a stimulus to speech. The be-
haviorist, of all persons, can not afford to give this account of the 
stimulus to speech. For if he does, he subjects himself to a final 
retort. The sensible presence of the knife is, then, already a case of 
knowledge, and speech instead of constituting knowledge merely 
voices, utters or reduplicates a knowledge already there in full ex-
istence. If the stimulus is not a thing sensibly present, neither is it 
merely some prior complete act or piece of behavior which causes con-
tractions in the vocal organs. The utterances of a talking-machine 
1
 The exception is the remarkably clear and comprehensive paper by Mead, 
in this JOURNAL, Vol. XIX, No. 6, on "A Behavioristic Account of the Signifi-
cant Symbol." 
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are induced by an internal mechanism but they are not speech or 
knowledge; neither is a hiccough or groan or sigh, although it is 
caused in the vocal musculature by prior organic conditions. 
There is a difference between the concept of stimulus-reaction and 
that of cause-effect. The former includes, of course, the latter, but it 
adds something. It has, in addition, the property of an adaptation, 
or maladaptation, which is effected. But adaptation alone is not 
enough to differentiate stimulus and response in the case of speech. 
A sigh may relieve suffering and in so far be adaptive. Seeing as 
an act may be part of the stimulus to saying " tha t is a knife," but 
it can not be the entire stimulus. For seeing as a complete stimulus 
gives rise to the response of reaching and taking or withdrawing, 
not of speech. What has to be accounted for is the postponement 
of the complete overt reaction, and its conversion into an intermediate 
vocal reaction. There must be some break in the seeing-reaching 
sequence, some obstacle to its occurrence, to induce a diversion from 
the hand to the voice. There must be a defective or hesitant connec-
tion between seeing and handling which is somehow made good and 
whole by speech. Hence the stimulus to speech can not be identified, 
per simpliciter, with its object. The latter is its consequence, not 
its antecedent. 
2. Before fully developing the implications of this point we 
must turn to another phase of speech reaction. Not every speech 
reaction, even when genuine and not a mere vocalization, is a cogni-
tive statement even by implication. Story-telling need not purport 
to state " f ac t s " or " t r u t h s " ; its interest may be increased by vrai-
semblance, but this trait serves a dramatic or imaginative end, not 
an intellectual one. A reader of Shakespeare may become a student 
of the sources upon which Shakespeare drew, and make speech reac-
tions to this study. Then the reaction is cognitive. But he need 
not do so; he may be content to confine his speech reaction to a 
dramatic production. Again the reader may become interested in 
whether Shakespeare meant to represent Hamlet as mad; then his 
reaction is a judgment. But he may be satisfied merely to use 
speech as a means of re-creating a Hamlet either sane or mad; as a 
mode of story-telling or drama it makes no difference. There is no 
outside criterion till we go outside of mere story-telling. The 
play's the thing and it has no object of knowledge. 
These remarks are intended to call attention to the need of dis-
covering some differential trait of those speech reactions which do 
constitute knowledge. A story or play is there, and the re-enacting of 
it in a speech mode is purely additive. It makes another piece of 
behavior, but this new mode of behavior does not react back into 
KNOWLEDGE AND SPEECH REACTION 563 
the play or story or its conditions. It is complete on its own account. 
A play of Shakespeare may mean a hundred different things to a 
hundred different audiences or a hundred different persons in the 
same audience, and the diversity of the hundred speech reactions 
evoked is no matter. The speech reactions need have no connection 
with what Shakespeare himself meant in his reaction, beyond being 
caused by the latter. But a judgment or thought about what Shake-
speare himself meant does not have any such self-sufficing independ-
ence. It has to link up with something outside itself. It has to be a 
reaction not merely to the play as a provocative cause, but has to be 
a response which somehow fits into or answers to the play as stimu-
lus. Our problem is to name that distinctive feature of a speech 
reaction which confers upon it the quality of response, reply, an-
swer; of supplying something lacking without it. 
We thus return to our prior analysis. The statement " this is a 
knife" is cognitive because it is more than a mere evocation of a prior 
piece of behavior. It serves to supplement or complete a behavior 
which is incomplete or broken without it. As response it is reaction 
in another sense than when we say in physics: action and reaction 
are equal and in opposite direction. Some physical reactions are 
quite independent of that action to which they are reactions except 
in a casual sense. But a response in statement is intimately con-
nected with that to which it answers. It is not merely to it or away 
from it, but is back into i t : that is, it continues, develops, directs 
something defective without it. Without speech reaction the action 
which causes it is blind trial or error; with it, or rather through it, 
the evoking action becomes purposive, that is, continuous, cumulative. 
To be more specific the response "this is a knife" is produced by 
reactions of seeing and incipient reactions of reaching, touching, 
handling, which are up to the point of speech reaction fumbling, 
choked and conflicting. Speech reaction unifies them into the atti-
tude of unhesitant readiness to seize and cut. It integrates or co-
ordinates behavior tendencies which without it are uncertain and 
more or less antagonistic. This trait is the differentia of judgment 
from speech reaction in the form of story telling and vicarious dra-
matic reproduction. Unless we acknowledge and emphasize this trait, 
the behavioristic theory falls an easy victim to the contention that 
language merely echoes or puts into verbal form an apprehension 
that is complete without it. The dilemma is unescapable. Either 
the speech reaction does something to what calls it out, modifying it 
and giving it a behavior characteristic which it otherwise does not 
have, or it is mere utterance of what already exists apart from it. 
This fact throws light upon the oversimplification referred to at 
the outset. It is easy to overlook the modifying, re-directive and 
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integrative function of speech as a response. Then only one side of 
it is recognized, that of its being caused by a prior action. The 
result is an identification of stimulus and object of knowledge which 
not merely goes contrary to facts but which undermines the behavior-
istic statement. For since the stimulus as cause is there when the 
reaction takes place, the object must also be there, if stimulus and 
object are simply identified. Then, cognitively speaking, speech is 
a futile echoing, however useful it may be as a practical device for 
fixing attention or supplying a convenient memorandum for recol-
lection. 
Mr. Mursell, in his recent interesting article,2 seems to me to 
illustrate the oversimplification in question and also its consequences. 
Speaking of perceptual judgments—speech reactions which state 
perceptions—he says they are " those judgments where the stimulus 
of the speech reaction is that to which the judgment has reference. 
I see a colored patch and respond by saying 'that is red.' I see 
my desk light burning and the muscles of my vocal organs are in-
nervated to make the assertion 'the light is burning.' " So far the 
account is inconclusive with respect to our problem. No one would 
deny that speech reaction has reference to its stimulus or that an 
act of seeing is at least part of its stimulus. But the passage con-
tinues as follows: " I n such cases the relation between the judg-
ment and its object seems sufficiently clear. The object is the 
cause of the judgment, the causal nexus taking an intricate path 
through the nervous ganglia.' ' (Italics mine.) Here the nature 
of the reference is unambiguously stated. Stimulus is cause, and 
as cause it is also the object of judgment. 
If the stimulus is not simply a tendency to see, that is, an innerva-
tion of the optical apparatus, but is a seeing of "desk-light-burning,'' 
the non-behaviorist can adequately retort that seeing the light and 
the desk and their respective positions is already a case of knowing 
or judgment, so that speech is merely an addition, supernumerary 
for judgment though doubtless of practical and social utility. The 
case stands otherwise if the stimulus is an obstructed or incomplete 
act of vision, and speech serves to release, to direct and clinch it. 
In the latter case, the patch would not be known as red, say, or the 
light as the light of a lamp on the desk until the speech reaction 
definitely determined a stimulus. There is nothing paradoxical in 
this conception. We constantly react to light by using it, without 
knowing or naming it—without an explicit distinction and identifica-
tion, and we very well know in dealing with novelties how names 
clear up and fix otherwise confusing and confused situations. Be-
2
 This JOURNAL, Vol. XIX, p. 187, " T r u t h as Correspondence." 
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havioristically, above all, we must conceive that speech response is 
not something final and isolated, but that it operates in turn as con-
dition of some more effective and adequate adjustment. While prac-
tically this function may be often performed in a direction away from 
its cause, as when we call out to a person in danger to look out, with-
out stopping to tell him why he should look out, intellectually its office 
is turned toward the cause to modify it. And the object of judgment 
is thus not the cause simply; it is the consequence, the modification 
effected in its cause by the speech reaction. The speech response 
is retroactive as it were; not that it can modify anything which has 
passed out of existence, but it influences a contemporary act of 
vision and a tendency to reach or handle so as to give them a di-
rected unity which they would not otherwise achieve save at the 
termination of a period of trial and error. 
3. The analysis is still oversimplified. Speaking is connected with 
an ear and auditory apparatus, and their neuro-muscular and intra-
organic connections. It is contrary to fact to identify a speech 
reaction with simply the innervation of the vocal organs. This gives 
no differentia of speech from a sigh, or grunt, or ejaculation due to 
respiratory reactions to pain. A speech reaction is the innerva-
tion-of-vocal-apparatus-as-stimulus-to-the-responses-of-other-organs-
through-the-auditory-apparatus. It involves the auditor and his 
characteristic reaction to speech heard. Often and primarily the 
auditor is another organism whose behavior is required to complete 
the speech reaction, this behavior being the objective aimed at in the 
speech reaction.3 
When the speech reaction consists in a "s i lent" innervation the 
principle is the same. It is then addressed to our own ear and the 
total connections thereof. Instead of making a command, or giving 
warning or advice to another agent for him to react to, we address 
it to ourself as a further re-agent. The agent issuing the stimulus 
and the one receiving it form two agents or persons or behavior sys-
tems. Failure expressly to note the implication of the auditor and 
his further behavior in a speech reaction is, I think, chiefly respon-
sible for the common belief that there is something arbitrary, con-
ceived in the interest of upholding a behavioristic theory at all cost, in 
identifying thought with speech. For when speech is confined to 
mere vocal innervations, the heart of knowledge is clearly not there. 
But neither is the heart of speech. Introduce connection with the 
responsive adjustments of the audience, and the forced paradox dis-
appears. We have, as Mr. Mead has shown, the conditions for 
meaning. 
3
 This is the point which is brought out so effectively in the article by 
Mead already referred to. 
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A speech reaction is a direction to subsequent behavior: Look 
and see; listen and hear; jump, turn to the left—remarks ad-
dressed to another who is in connection with ourselves, a partaker 
in the same behavior system, and then to ourselves, as a further 
re-agent, when there is no other person present. 
Commands, optatives and subjunctives are the primary modes 
of speech reaction; the indicative or expositive mood is an ampli-
ficatipn. For example, even a treatise by a mathematician or chem-
ist is a guide to the undertaking of certain behavior reactions—a 
series of acts which when executed will result in seeing the things 
which the author has responded to with certain statements. It fol-
lows that the object of a speech reaction is the concordant responses 
which it sets up. Antecedent stimuli are a part of this object but 
are not the complete object of knowledge; the latter involves the 
further determinations which antecedent stimuli undergo by means 
of behavior evoked by speech. The object of knowledge or speech 
is the ultimate consent of the coordinated responses of speaker and 
hearer; the object of affirmation is the confirmation of co-adapted 
behavior. Its object is that future complex coordination of serial 
acts into a single behavior-system which would not exist without 
it. One's responses are co-adapted to the auditor's and the audi-
tor 's to one's own. Certain consequences follow. 
1. The first is the refutation of solipsism. Not only can two 
persons know the same object, but a single personal reaction can 
not know an identical object. As a single and singular being I may 
make a primary non-cognitive reaction to a stimulus. I may shiver 
when the ear is stimulated in a certain way. But when I say, 
" tha t is the noise of a saw" the statement is addressed to the re-
sponses of an auditor in such a way as to demand a concordant re-
action. He listens and looks, and says, "no, that is the sound of 
an axle of a wheel." Then I have to look, to respond with further 
behavior. The speech reaction is not complete till a concordant re-
sponse is established. In other words, speech is conversation; it in-
volves a duality of experiences or views. A single presence or view 
does not constitute judgment or statement. This particular 
manner of putting the fact may be unusual but there is nothing 
strikingly novel in the conception. Cognition involves recognition, 
acknowledgment, a contrast and connection of two different times 
or places of experience by means of which a distinctive identifica-
tion is set up. A single act can not, as singular, establish the identi-
fication required to characterize an event as an object. There must 
be recurrence in a slightly different context. This is a thing that 
requires a response like that made before, or which will exact a 
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like response in the future, or of some other re-agent in the present. 
And without the sameness or correspondence of the responses of 
the two times or places, there is literally, contra-diction. An ob-
ject of knowledge must consistently cover or comprehend responses 
to at least two distinct stimuli. 
2. This conclusion has a direct bearing upon the nature of the 
correspondence which defines truth. The correspondence is found 
in the inclusion in a single contemporary behavior system of di-
verse behavior reactions. No correspondence can be conclusively 
established between a present response and a past one in their 
separation, or between a present one and a future one in their 
separateness. There must be one harmonious behavior function 
which includes the elements of both. Mr. Mursell in the article 
referred to makes correspondence retroactive. He says:4 "When I 
assert that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, I am reproducing the 
original reaction made by observers two thousand years ago, who 
saw him splash through the stream and found in the sight a stimu-
lus to the response 'He has crossed the Rubicon.' " This account 
involves the mistake pointed out in the case of the statement "this 
is red color." It assumes that the object is known and also truly 
known prior to the speech reaction. How do I know that some 
former observer made the speech reaction ascribed to him? This 
ascription is the point at issue, and the account quoted merely begs 
the question. A correct statement of the data that Mr. Mursell 
recognizes would be: "I say that an observer two thousand years 
ago said that Caesar has crossed the Rubicon; then I reproduce 
that saying on my own account. Then I say that the two sayings 
agree or correspond." Undoubtedly they do. But at no point 
have I got beyond my own sayings. The correspondence is merely 
between a saying of my own about what some one else said with 
another saying of my own. There is only a new kind of solipsism, 
that of private speech. In this historical case, I clearly can not 
direct my remark to a man long since dead and secure concordant 
behavior response from him. But I do address myself to others 
and say that if they will look at historic records, including those 
of a subsequent course of events, their responses will correspond to 
mine—or that the different reactions will all enter into a single com-
plex behavior system. 
Another illustration of Mr. Mursell's brings out the same points. 
He says: "Suppose I say Napoleon's tomb is in Paris. Let us as-
sume that I read the words somewhere. Pushing back along the 
chain of recorded responses of which the printed symbols that I 
4
 p . 187. 
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saw are the last, I come finally to the place where the original ob-
server, who started the whole series, stood. I am directed to a 
particular locus, and there I receive a stimulus that issues in the 
response, 'Yes, Napoleon's tomb is in Pa r i s / And this it is which 
constitutes the truth of the judgment. . . . The chain of recorded 
responses always directs us to some specific locus."5 The last 
statement must be unqualifiedly admitted. But what and where 
is the locus? If it is merely past—and not a stimulus-response con-
tinuing into the present—then I can only state that "I say that an 
original observer said that the tomb is in Par is . " In short, as I 
push back along the chain, I finally come after all only to my own 
saying about what another said. If I go to Paris then indeed I 
come upon quite another saying which is congruous with my prior 
saying that the tomb is in Paris, but in this case the object is not 
one of a retroactive response. Or, I may respond without going 
to Paris in such a way as to call out reactions from other persons 
who make the same deliverance—that the tomb is in Paris. Here 
also the object is the attained co-adaptations in behavior. 
Supposing we take a judgment about an event in the geological 
ages preceding the existence of human beings or any organisms 
possessed of speech reactions. In such instances, it is clear that 
there can be no question of correspondence with the speech reac-
tion of a contemporary observer. By description the retroactive 
correspondence of sayings is ruled out. Yet no one doubts that 
there are some judgments about this ancient state of affairs which 
are truer than others. How can this be possible, since there can be 
no question of reproducing the judgment of an observer? If we 
say that what we now judge is what a contemporary observer would 
have said if he had been present, we are clearly begging the ques-
tion. Nor could a contemporary observer have made as accurate 
and comprehensive a judgment in some respects as we can make, 
since we can also judge what occurred at a given period in the 
light of what happened afterwards. Clearly our speech reaction 
is to observations of present perceptions of data, rocks, fossils, etc. 
The other auditor and speaker to whom the statements are ad-
dressed are other possible observers of these and similar data. The 
ulterior "object" is the concordant, mutually reinforcing behavior 
system, including, of course, the speech responses. Sciousness in 
this, as in other cases, is con-sciousness. And this equating is not 
a mere figure of speech; it gives the original meaning of the word. 
Summing up, we may say that there are three types of response 
which it is necessary to distinguish. First, there is direct or-
ganic response-of-the-autonomic-and-sensori-central-motor-systems-to 
5
 Op. c i t . , p. 188. 
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stimuli. These stimuli are not, for and in the reaction, objects. 
Their connection with response is causal rather than cognitional. 
The reaction is physico-chemical, though it may terminate in a 
spatial or molar change. Neither the stimulus nor the response is 
an object of knowledge, though it may become part of an object-
to-be-known. If the stimulus were adequate or complete, complete 
adaptative response or use would take place. Being incomplete, 
it is a challenge to a further response which will give it determinate 
character. Thereby the to-be-known becomes an object of knowl-
edge ; it becomes an answer instead of a query. 
Secondly, the speech response occupies an intermediate position. 
By clinching, fixing its stimulus, it releases further modes of re-
sponse. Saying that the colored patch is red enables us to take it 
as the thing we have been hunting for, or to react to it as a definite 
warning of danger. The prior activities form part of the subject-
matter of the thing thus known. But they are not the object 
known. The object known is the coordination of the prior behavior 
with the consequent behavior which is effected by the medium of 
speech. Till the assumption is banished that stimulus to knowing 
and object of knowledge are the same thing, the analysis of knowl-
edge and truth will be confused. Thirdly, the eventual coordina-
tion of behavior involves the response of a further re-agent, namely, 
the auditor, whether another organism or one's own. This coordina-
tion of the activity of speaker and hearer forms the ulterior object 
of knowledge. As a co-ordination or co-adaptation of at least two 
respondents, it constitutes that correspondence which we call 
knowledge or truth. Correspondence of past and present responses 
can be determined only by means of a further response which in-
cludes both of them within itself in a unified way. The theory ex-
plains the relation of truth to consistency as well as to correspond-
ence. The different responses must consist, cohere, together. Con-
sistency gets an objective, non-mentalistic meaning when it is under-
stood to mean capacity for integration of different responses in a 
single more comprehensive behavior. 
We may conclude by suggesting a possible explanation of the 
oversimplification of the behavioristic account of speech which has 
been pointed out. Introspective psychology of necessity broke up 
the subject-matter of psychology into a number of disjecta membra, 
of disjoined fragments treated as independent self-sufficing wholes. 
I say "of necessity'' because the connecting links of these frag-
ments axe found in a context of environmental conditions and or-
ganic behavior of which the introspectionist can not be aware. 
Now behaviorism has too often confined itself to finding behavior-
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istic counterparts of the same material and topics with which intro-
spective psychology has dealt.6 Consequently actual and concrete 
behavior has been broken up into a number of disjoined pieces 
instead of being analyzed freely on its own account. Thus certain 
errors of introspective psychology have been reduplicated in the 
very behavioristic psychology which is a protest against introspec-
tionism. 
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PROFESSOR PERRY'S EMPIRICISM 
THE present age may not unfairly be characterized as one intent upon immediate results. The remarkable achievements of the 
sciences, pure and applied, seemingly put the philosopher, the plod-
ding student of ultimate principles, to shame, unless he, too, can 
produce for the edification of an insatiable public some new and 
novel contributions pointing directly to the advancement of the in-
dividual and social good. While psychologists are busy devising 
intelligence tests, or performing hypothetical experiments upon the 
human being, under the inspiration of "behaviorism," quite as if 
man were a lower species of animal, the philosopher must evidently 
do something to "save caste," at least by way of showing his inter-
est in such scientific advances. 
To the attempt to keep in touch with these latest developments 
and to express his views on the various ethical and sociological 
problems associated with them, Professor Ralph Barton Perry is 
devoting his best attention; it is, therefore, by the study of his 
writings that one may hope most conveniently to gain an under-
standing of the philosophical implications involved in these move-
ments. It is possible, however, that in his preoccupation with the 
treatment of specific details, the reader may sometimes lose sight of 
the fundamental principles upon which Professor Perry's particular 
solution of these problems depends. Such being the case, it seems 
essential to pass in review Professor Perry's various utterances 
with the special purpose of bringing these principles and presup-
positions to light; to see in general how he conceives of the relation 
6
 The case is quite analogous with the situation described by Mr. Kantor 
with reference to the nervous system. See his article in this JOURNAL, Vol. 
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Mr. Kantor states, too often " the nervous system is taken to be the tangible 
counterpart of the intangible psychic.'' Similarly, certain modes of behaviors 
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processes. 
